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WORLD BANK GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Average annual variations, at fixed prices  -  June 2016 
The World Bank’s forecasting scenario presented in June contains several downward revisions on growth 
estimates. Global income is at 2.4% in 2016 (-0.5 since January, same as 2015) and accelerates at 2.8% in 
2017 (-0.3%), and will reach 3.0% (-0.1) in 2018.  Growth forecasts were prepared before the British 
referendum, and Brexit can be expected to further reduce global growth, though only slightly. 
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WORLD BANK GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Average annual variations, at fixed prices  -  June 2016 
For major economies, growth is at 1.7% for the current year (-0.5), 1.9% in the next (-0.2%) and still 1.9% 
in 2018 (-0.1). For emerging economies, respectively, 3.5% (-0.6); 4.4% (-0.3) and 4.7% (-0.2). In particular, 
for 2016 the most aggressive cuts are for the United States (-0.8 at 1.9%) and for Japan (-0.8 at 0.5%), while 
for Eurozone the correction is only marginal (-0.1 at 1.6%). Among emerging economies, the worst figure is 
for Brazil (-1.5 at -4.0%), followed by Russia (-0.5 at -1.2%), both in obvious contraction. India was reduced 
by two tenths at 7.6%, while China is unaltered, with a forecast still at 6.7%.  
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GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, TRADE AND CONFIDENCE 
Growth rates  -  pmi diff from 50 -  three month averages   
International trade and industrial activity have a still declining dynamic, with confidence index around 
neutral... 
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GLOBAL IND. PROD., TRADE AND CONF. 
Growth rates-  pmi diff from 50  -  data 
…but from real data we see a Spring phase with more promising notes. This phenomenon is surely connected 
to the recovery of raw materials’ prices. The index, net of the energy component, in July signals a recovery 
that on an annual base  has almost nullified negative values in the order of twenty percentage points. 
GLOBAL IND. PROD., TRADE AND CONF. 
Growth rates  -  commodity: monthly average 
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CONFIDENCE INDICATORS– INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES 
Aggregate values in various countries  
Compared to a still declining trend, leading indicators registered a rather significant reaction. The acceleration 
has brought the index relative to major economies in an area compatible with a positive growth evolution, 
while that relative to emerging markets has diminished the probability of further decline.   
CONFIDENCE INDICATORS 
Surveys’ aggregate values by activity type 
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S&P500  - TWO DAY PERFORMANCE 
Observation period 2006 -  July 2015 
Brexit has been an historical event for the UK and for the whole world, with all characteristics of a shock, but 
compared to previous episodes, it has produced a different kind of discontinuity...Markets’ reaction was 
immediate, measuring all the uncertainty of a scenario whose effects will be confusing for several months. In 
the equity market, the indexes’ fall was potent, comparable with other more or less recent events...  
 
FTSE100  - TWO DAY PERFORMANCE 
Observation period 2006 – July 2015 
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FTSEMIB  -  TWO DAY PERFORMANCE 
observation period 2006 – July 2015 
STOXX50  -   TWO DAY PERFORMANCE 
observation period 2006 – July 2015 
In Europe, the drop in stock prices has been even more violent. In any case, we believe that Brexit isn’t 
comparable to the crisis that followed Lehman Brothers’ default, a serious infection that in no time hit finance 
and the real economy. In this case, the contageon is absolutely containable.  
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Bond earnings have generally declined. Those of safe havens have seen an impressive boost, while 
periphericals had to absorb the peak caused by Brexit before continuing their favourable descendant phase. 
In the equity compartment, the announcement effect created a very strong general decline, but then there’s 
been a decided reaction. Japan, United States and even United Kingdom have exceeded pre-Brexit levels, 
Germany and Italy are still below, but favourable conditions persist.  Decreasing earnings and growing stock 
prices have a common matrix, i.e., central banks’ possible even more expansionary policy. 
 
TEN YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND 
EARNINGS 
1 February 2016=100 
STOCK MARKET INDEXES 
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The devaluation of the pound is probably the most persistent effect of the referendum that will take Great 
Britain out of the EU.. 
 $/£  -  TWO DAY PERFORMANCE  
Observation period 2006 – July 2015 – positive values = 
Appreciation $ 
€/£  -  TWO DAY PERFORMANCE  
Observation period 2006 – July 2015 – positive values=appreciation € 
$/£   &  GOVERNMENT RELIABILITY 
Exchange rate and CDS on British debt, 5 year bonds 
After Brexit, S&P 
and Fitch 
lowered Britain’s 
debt rating from  
AAA to  AA 
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Brexit has had beneficial effects on emerging currencies that have generally appreciated thanks to the Fed’s 
greater prudence in terms of increasing rates that prevailed over the risk averse impulse. Surely China is an 
exception, where the effects of the US’s monetary policy is lower than compressive effects such as … 
EMERGING CURRENCIES – CROSS VERSUS $ 
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YUAN RENMIMBI -  SPOT, FIXING, OFFSHORE 
Exchange rate on  $ 
CHINA   -   CAPITAL FLOWS  
proxy -  bn $ 
CHINA  INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
bn $ 
… the increase in risk aversion that in this specific case causes the yen to strengthen, the PBoC’s expansive 
monetary policy and the capital outflow that isn’t thwarted by Chinese authorities, as it is considered a 
consequence of the country’s greater openness to the rest of the world. 
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BREXIT: impact on monetary  
policies and rates 
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BREXIT:  
Impact on growth 
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BREXIT:  
Impact on exchange rates 
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DISCLAIMER 
 
 
The content of the preceding pages has been prepared by Banca Aletti&C. S.p.A. (“Banca 
Aletti”) together with the European University Institute. Banca Aletti – belonging to the 
Gruppo Banco Popolare – is a broker authorized by law, listed in the Register of Banks, 
number 5383. 
  
With this document Banca Aletti proposes to its customers’ evaluation information retrieved 
from reliable sources in the system of financial markets and – where deemed necessary – 
its own opinion on the matter with possible commentary (notes, observations, evaluations). 
  
We point out that the information provided, communicated in good faith and on the basis of 
data available at the moment, could be inexact, incomplete or not up to date and is apt to 
variation, even without notice, at any given moment.  
 
This document cannot be in any way considered to be a sales or subscription or exchange 
offer, nor any form of soliciting sales, subscriptions or exchange of financial instruments or 
of investment in general and is neither a consulting in financial investment matters.  
 
Banca Aletti is not responsible for the effects deriving from the use of this document. The 
information made available through the present document must not be considered as a 
recommendation or invitation on Banca Aletti’s side to accomplish a particular transaction 
or to perform a specific operation.  
  
Each investor should form his own independent persuasion, based exclusively on his own 
evaluations on the opportunity to invest. The decision to undertake any form of financial 
operation is at the exclusive risk of the addressees of the present disclaimer. 
 
The source of all data and graphs is provided by Thomson Reuters where not otherwise 
specified.   
 
